

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP82M00531R000800070037-4

Executive Registry

70-1521

26 MAR 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence  
Programs Evaluation

John:

I have looked over your paper on Intelligence  
Planning Guidance for the 1970s and offer the following few items:

1. Considered in its entirety, the paper adds up to rather full listing of items which could commit the Director to actions in a variety of fields including resource allocations, setting of priorities, evaluation of programs, interface with consumers, et al. In the hands of USIB recipients the document is probably quite useful, particularly if it leads to a series of actions designed to provide solutions to the problems described. In the hands of PFIAB, however, the paper could prove to be a weapon for use in holding the Director to account. A paper disseminated to USIB will doubtless come available to PFIAB and we should be clear about the implications.

*Revised*  
2. I find paragraph 69 of potential trouble. It is neither necessary nor wise to associate the Director or the Community with a position that "resource limitations will make it inevitable that U.S. intelligence will be 'surprised' by crisis occurrences...." As the paper implies elsewhere, if we set our priorities correctly and move to obtain a sufficiency of resources, intelligence will meet its responsibilities.

*Revised 52*  
3. The theme of more closely relating intelligence producer and user is a good one but I wonder if in some instances it might make the Director susceptible to a charge of not having taken relatively simple actions. For example, paragraph 52 in effect asks for guidance from policy-makers with respect to Africa. This should be easy enough to obtain. The same theme occurs in paragraphs 70, 71 and 73.

REVISED NO CHANGE

? don't include in the community.

Approved For Release 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP82M00531R000800070037-4

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP82M00531R000800070037-4

4. Paragraph 89, concerning warning and the question of intelligence versus operations, seems to be raising a major jurisdictional issue. Is this worth a battle?

REVISED

5. Of smaller import are a few relatively minor concerns about how an outsider might regard some of the points in the paper. For example, it might be considered a bit self-serving to the Agency to read (paragraphs 45 and 46) an exhortation to expand clandestine activities or (paragraph 57) to invite DCS into increased activity. Last, I think there may be a degree of stridency in paragraph 66 concerning reconnaissance, particularly with regard to field processing and exploitation. This would seem debatable in these days of fast jet travel from any point on the globe.

NO CHANGE - CALL ALL TYPES & DISCUSS

ADDED

I hope these remarks are useful to you. For my part, I am hopeful that a paper such as yours will lead to useful action programs and be assured of our desire to be helpful in this regard.

L. K. White

Executive Director - Comptroller

John: This was written by PPB at my request. I asked them to be critical and particularly to look for things which might not put the Director or the Agency in the best light. Please feel free to do with it what you wish.

Law

Approved For Release 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP82M00531R000800070037-4

SECRET